

⁶The Board also found that resolution of existing uncertainty as to whether GAO, GPO and Library employees alleging violations of sections 204–207 of the CAA may use CAA procedures was an additional reason to include recommendations about coverage.

⁷See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8).

⁸The private-sector laws made applicable by the CAA are listed in note 1, at page 1, above.

⁹1998 Section 102(b) Report at 16.

¹⁰Id. At 17.

¹¹The only exception is the WARN Act which has no such authorities.

¹²1998 Section 102(b) Report at 27.

¹³In December 1998, at the time the 1998 Section 102(b) Report issued, there were four Board members; the fifth Board member's term had expired and a new appointee had not yet been named. Since the issuance of the 1998 Report the terms of the four Board members who participated in that Report have expired. At present, the five-Member Board of Directors is again at its full complement; three Members were appointed in October 1999 and two Members were appointed in May 2000.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board recently completed a review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) nonproliferation programs with Russia and released a report card assessing the contributions and needs of those programs. Two renowned Americans, former Senator Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, served as co-chairmen of a bipartisan task force comprised of technical experts, respected academicians and distinguished Congressmen and Senators from both political parties representing both chambers of the Congress. My colleagues will be interested to know that former Senators on the task force included Senators Baker, Boren, Hart, McClure, Nunn, and Simpson. Former House Members included Representatives Derrick, Hamilton, and Skaggs. In short, this task force brought together an experienced bipartisan group of esteemed experts whose views are well respected to examine the status of DOE's nonproliferation programs with Russia. The report they have produced should be required reading for everyone concerned about what the nation needs to do to meet our most important national security requirements.

No one could question that the greatest risks of proliferating weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) come from the massive WMD infrastructure left behind when the Soviet Union dissolved. Experts estimate that the former Soviet Union produced more than 40,000 nuclear weapons and left behind a huge legacy of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—enough to build as many or more than 40,000 additional nuclear weapons. We are just now beginning to comprehend the vast quantities of chemical and biological weapons produced in the

former Soviet Union. We have learned much about the stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials that still exist in today's Russia. We have a fuller understanding of the extensive industrial infrastructure in Russia which is still capable of conducting research and producing such weapons. We are anxiously aware of the thousands of experienced Russian scientists and technicians who worked in that complex, many of whom are in need of a stable income.

Those huge numbers assume frightening implications when one considers that two years ago, conspirators at a Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy facility were caught trying to steal nuclear materials almost sufficient to build a nuclear weapon. At the same time, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk, a closed "nuclear city" in the Russian nuclear weapons complex, warned that a popular uprising was unavoidable in his city since nuclear scientists and other workers had not been paid for many months and that basic medical supplies were not available to serve the population. In December, 1998, Russian authorities arrested an employee at Russia's premier nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov for espionage and charged him with attempting to sell nuclear weapon design information to agents from Iraq and Afghanistan. I am certain that many of my colleagues in the Senate have heard the stories regarding attempted smuggling of radioactive materials by Russian Navy personnel aboard their decaying submarine fleet. There are numerous other incidents that bring the Russian proliferation threat from incomprehensible quantities to real life threats of massive destruction.

In reviewing those threats and the various DOE programs underway to meet those dangers, the task force drew several major conclusions and recommendations on how we should proceed to reduce and ultimately eliminate the proliferation threats posed by Russia. Mr. President and colleagues of the Senate, let me cite those findings and recommendations for you.

The task force found that the "most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons—usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home." They noted that "current nonproliferation programs in the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense (DoD), and related agencies have achieved impressive results (in supporting nonproliferation objectives) . . . , but their limited mandate and function fall short of what is required to address adequately the threat."

The task force calls for the new Administration and the 107th Congress to

increase our efforts to meet the proliferation threat, the dimensions of which we are only beginning to fully understand. In so doing, the report recommends that we undertake a net assessment of the threat, develop a strategy to meet it using specific goals and measurable objectives, establish a centralized command of our financial and human resources needed to do the job, and identify criteria for measuring the benefits to the United States of expanded nonproliferation programs. In particular, the task force urges the President in consultation with the Congress and in cooperation with the Russian Federation to quickly formulate a strategic plan to prevent the outflow of Russian nuclear weapons scientific expertise and to secure or neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia during the next eight to ten year period. The task force estimates that it would take less than one percent of the U.S. defense budget or less than \$30 billion over the next decade to do the job.

In short there is no more cost effective way to achieve our own national security goals than by investing in the DOE and DoD nonproliferation programs being conducted in cooperation with Russia. I urge the President, members of his administration, and my colleagues in the Senate to understand the importance of these programs to the nation. As we proceed in the uncharted waters of relations between the United States and Russia in the coming months and years, I hope we will be mindful of the central importance of these programs to our national security and to their great significance to cooperative relationships between our countries. I urge all of you to read this report carefully and support its recommendations during the forthcoming legislative cycle.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

RECOGNIZING MR. JIM NICHOLSON

• Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate and recognize a fellow Coloradan, Mr. Jim Nicholson, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee. My friend and colleague has provided the State of Colorado, the Nation and the Republican Party outstanding service where he has devoted countless hours and tireless efforts with the Republican National Committee. I am here today to say a heartfelt "Thank You Jim," on behalf of all Coloradans.

He rose through the ranks of the Republican National Committee over the years. Based on his record of ability and accomplishments, he was elected Chairman where he served with honor and distinction.

Jim Nicholson has definitely demonstrated his commitment to ideals